

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		3 MAR 1969
TO:	SA / IDA	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
New page 23 for Mr. Rowen's Worldwide Briefing report.		
FROM:		
C/NIC		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO.
1 FEB 55 241REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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Europe/INF/Soviet Resources and Leverage

Mr. Harry Rowen

The main focus of Soviet policy toward Europe is to separate Europe from the United States by exploiting fear of nuclear war. As Soviet nuclear power has increased, the German and several European governments concluded that additional "coupling" was needed to offset growing Soviet strength. This led to the "two track" NATO missile decision on deployment and negotiations. Andropov is pursuing an imaginative strategy which exploits the controversy over the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles, especially in Germany. He is showing a willingness to reduce -- but not give up -- the monopoly it has with about 500 SS-4s, 5s and 20s in return for no US deployment. Instead, he would have the planned British and French nuclear forces count against the Soviet total. This position effectively freezes out the US.

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The stakes are very large. The Soviets appear firm in the negotiations that no US missiles are acceptable, but if the Germans, British, and Italians hold to their positions on deployment, by the end of this year we may see a shift in the Soviet negotiating position. The Soviets may also try to carry out their threat to put us in an "analogous" position in response to deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles by putting missiles in the Western Hemisphere or more missiles at sea.

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The Soviets sustain the threat to Europe and the others that we have described with an economic base which is less than half of ours and one that